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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court’s decision on intermediate appeal reversing Jay 
Ray Bright’s convictions for driving under the influence and possession of paraphernalia. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On the night of December 30, 2015, Officer Phillips was dispatched to the Tesoro gas 
station in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, on a welfare check.  (Tr., p.92, L.7 – p.93, L.1.)  Upon arriving, 
he found Bright asleep, sitting in the driver’s seat of a car parked in front of a gas pump.  (Tr., 
p.93, Ls.2-7.)  Looking inside of the car through its windows, the officer could see syringe caps.  
(Tr., p.93, Ls.8-16.)  Despite the officer’s efforts, Bright did not wake, and Officer Phillips called 
for backup.  (Tr., p.93, L.17 – p.94, L.1.)  Once backup arrived, the officers woke Bright, though 
with some difficulty, and Bright remained lethargic and less coherent throughout the encounter.  
(Tr., p.99, L.3 – p.100, L.5; p.118, Ls.10-17; p.119, Ls.12-20.)   
Suspecting that Bright might be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the officers had 
Bright perform field sobriety tests and a breath test.  (Tr., p.120, L.9 – p.122, L.7.)  Bright passed 
the breath test but failed the field sobriety tests.  (Tr., p.126, L.23 – p.128, L.12; p.130, Ls.4-16.)  
During a conversation with one of the officers at the scene, Bright admitted that he had driven 
himself to the gas station.  (Tr., p.145, Ls.16-22.)  Based on his failure on the field sobriety tests 
and observations of his impairment, officers arrested Bright for driving under the influence.  (Tr., 
p.129, Ls.2-11.)  Because the officers’ observations were consistent with impairment due to 
methamphetamine use, they also requested a drug recognition expert.  (Tr., p.129, L.7 – p.130, 
L.21.)  The drug recognition expert met Bright at the jail, but Bright refused to complete the 
evaluation.  (Tr., p.153, Ls.4-20.)  He did, however, submit a urine sample (Tr., p.153, Ls.21-22; 
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p.157, L.8 – p.158, L.10), which came back positive for methamphetamine (Tr., p.173, Ls.14-16; 
p.176, Ls.18-24). 
Following Bright’s arrest for driving under the influence, officers also completed an 
inventory search of his car.  (Tr., p.100, Ls.14-16; p.131, Ls.9-14.)  During that inventory search, 
they discovered items of paraphernalia, including more syringe caps and a meth pipe.  (Tr., 
p.100, L.23 – p.101, L.4; p.131, Ls.15-25.) 
After a series of motions, the state ultimately charged Bright with driving under the 
influence of drugs and possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp.247-48.)  Following a trial, the jury 
returned guilty verdicts on both counts.  (R., p.246.)  Bright filed a motion for acquittal or new 
trial, arguing that the state failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction; that the 
jury’s verdict was contrary to law and evidence; that the magistrate erred when it declined to 
present Bright’s “Misfortune defense”; and that the lab technician’s expert opinion was 
inadmissible.  (R., pp.249-53.)  The magistrate court denied the motion.  (R., p.278.)  The 
magistrate court entered judgment against Bright and sentenced him to a year in jail, suspended 
that sentence, and placed him on probation for a period of two years.  (R., pp.270-73.)   
Bright appealed his conviction to the district court.  (R., pp.280-82.)  Bright presented 
several arguments to the district court including, for the first time on appeal, an allegation that 
the magistrate had failed to properly instruct the jury on reasonable doubt and lowered the state’s 
burden of proof.  (R., pp.299-330, 360-67.)  The district court concluded “that the trial court 
committed error in its reasonable doubt instruction to the jury,” and vacated the magistrate’s 
judgment and remanded for further proceedings.  (R., pp.371-72.)  The state filed a timely notice 
of appeal.  (R., pp.374-76.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err on intermediate appeal when it determined, without applying the 
correct standard of fundamental error, that the reasonable doubt instruction given by the 





The District Court Erred On Intermediate Appeal When It Determined That The Jury 
Instructions Reduced The State’s Burden Of Proof 
 
A. Introduction 
Following voir dire and before opening statements in Bright’s trial, the magistrate judge 
instructed the jury on reasonable doubt as follows:  
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be 
innocent.  The presumption of innocence means two things.  First, the State has 
the burden of proving the defendant guilty.  State has that burden throughout the 
trial.  The defendant is never required to prove his or her innocence, nor does the 
defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all. 
 
Second, the State must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
A reasonable doubt is not a mere possibility or imaginary doubt.  It’s a doubt 
based on reason and common sense.   
 
(Tr., p.73, Ls.3-13.)  The court then interjected the following comments:  “And, as I said 
yesterday, you didn’t check your common sense at the door.  Okay.  You’ve all broken up fights 
and arguments, you know how to do this.”  (Tr., p.73, Ls.13-16.)  The magistrate then continued: 
It may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence 
or from a lack of evidence.  If after considering all the evidence you have a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
 
(Tr., p.73, Ls.3-21.)  Bright raised no objections. 
After the jury convicted Bright of misdemeanor driving under the influence of drugs and 
possession of paraphernalia, he appealed his conviction to the district court.  For the first time on 
intermediate appeal, Bright argued, inter alia, that the magistrate court had erred in its 
reasonable doubt instruction to the jury and reduced the state’s burden of proof.  (R., pp.322-25, 
365-66.)  Applying an incorrect standard of review to Bright’s unpreserved claim of error, the 
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district court agreed.  (R., pp.371-72.)  Under the correct legal standards, Bright failed to show 
error, much less fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue.  The 
opinion of the district court on intermediate appeal should therefore be reversed and Bright’s 
convictions for driving under the influence and possession of paraphernalia be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate capacity, 
the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 
709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 
P.3d 758 (2005)).   
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the appellate 
court exercises free review.  State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853, 864-65 
(2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 (2000)).  “An erroneous 
instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a whole misled the jury 
or prejudiced a party.”  State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 
(2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)). 
 
C. Bright Failed To Show That The Magistrate Committed Fundamental Error When It 
Commented To The Jury That It Should Use Its Common Sense When Evaluating 
Reasonable Doubt 
 
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be 
made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal.”  State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (“An 
error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal.”) (citing State v. Sheahan, 
139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)).  This same principle applies to alleged errors in 
-- --- -----
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jury instructions.  See I.C.R. 30(b) (“No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give 
an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, 
stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection.”); 
Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865.  Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this 
state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine.  Id.; see also State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
As pointed out by the state on intermediate appeal, Bright did not object below to the 
magistrate court’s comments regarding the evaluation of reasonable doubt.  (See R., p.350.)  
Thus, in order to prevail, Bright was required to show that the magistrate’s comments rose to the 
level of fundamental error.  But the district court failed to apply this correct legal standard on 
intermediate appeal, and so erred. 
Under the correct legal standard, to establish fundamental error, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged 
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. 
 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  Bright did not attempt to show fundamental error in 
his claim that the magistrate court’s instructions lowered the state’s burden of proof (see R., 
pp.322-25), nor would he have been able to show fundamental error. 
The state agrees that, in every criminal prosecution, it bears the burden of proving the 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).  The 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires courts to instruct the jury on the 
state’s duty to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 
U.S. 478 (1977).  Had the instructions given by the magistrate court to the jury in this case 
-- --- --- -----
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reduced the state’s burden of proof, such would have been a constitutional violation that would 
have resulted in structural error.  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278-82 (1993).  That, 
however, is clearly not what happened in this case.   
First, there was no fundamental error in this case because, under any standard, the jury 
instructions were not erroneous.  As noted above, when determining whether the jury 
instructions fairly and adequately instructed the jury, the instructions must be considered as a 
whole.  See Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 373-74, 247 P.3d at 600-01.  The instructions that were 
given to the jury in this case for their deliberations are found at pages 213-45 of the record.  The 
reasonable doubt instruction was actually given twice, both in Jury Instruction Nos. 1 and 4.  (R., 
pp.216-17, 222.)  These instructions track the model reasonable doubt instruction, I.C.J.I. 103, 
and are therefore presumptively correct.  McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2, 225 P.3d 700, 
704 n.2 (2010) (citations omitted).  Bright did not rebut this presumption.  The jury was further 
instructed in relation to each charge that, to find Bright guilty, the state had to prove each 
element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  (R., pp.233, 236 (Instruction Nos. 
13, 16).) 
Bright of course has never challenged the actual jury instructions in his case, but rather 
the magistrate’s comments on the instructions (set forth above): “And, as I said yesterday, you 
didn’t check your common sense at the door.  Okay.  You’ve all broken up fights and arguments, 
you know how to do this.”  (Tr., p.73, Ls.13-16.)  On intermediate appeal, Bright asserted that 
these comments “equat[ed] the state’s burden with resolving a common squabble” and 
“denigrated not only the reasonable doubt standard and the burden placed on the state, but the 
criminal jury trial system, equating it to a neighborhood squabble.”  (R., pp.322-25.)  Bright’s 
argument fails.  When evaluating the propriety of a trial judge’s comments during its charge to 
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the jury, appellate courts consider four factors: (1) the materiality of the comment; (2) its 
emphatic or overbearing nature; (3) the efficacy of any curative instruction; and (4) the 
prejudicial effect of the comment in light of the jury instruction as a whole.  United States v. 
Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 268-69 (10th Cir. 1984).   
Regarding the materiality and emphatic nature of the magistrate’s comments, they were 
anything but.  Far from a solemn charge, the magistrate judge’s offhand comments appear to be 
just that—offhand comments; they were never made part of the instructions given to the jury for 
its deliberation.  (See R., pp.213-45.)  And even if the court’s offhand comments were 
instructions, as the United States Supreme Court has made clear, jury instructions cannot be 
given their worst possible reading; rather “the proper inquiry is not whether the instruction 
‘could have’ been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury did so apply it.”  Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1991) (citing Estelle 
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, and n.4 (1991)) (emphasis original).  Bright has never shown any 
likelihood that the jury applied the magistrate’s comments, offered during the reading of the 
reasonable doubt instruction, in an unconstitutional manner. 
As to whether other instructions could have cured any error associated with the trial 
judge’s comments, as noted above, the magistrate provided the jury with written instructions, 
which twice correctly set forth the state’s burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt and twice specifically applied that standard to the charges against Bright.  (See 
R., pp.216-17, 222, 233, 236.)  These instructions are unchallenged.  In addition to providing the 
jury with written instructions, the magistrate court also twice orally instructed the jury on 
reasonable doubt.  In addition to its instruction following voir dire, the magistrate explained prior 
to voir dire that the state bore the burden of proof in criminal trials, and that it had to prove the 
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.11-21.)  The magistrate further explained that 
“reasonable doubt is not mere possible or imaginary doubt.  It’s a doubt based on reason and 
common sense.  It may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all evidence or from a 
lack of evidence.”  (Tr., p.32, Ls.21-25.)  And the court correctly informed the jury that, if 
“[a]fter considering all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt[, 
y]ou must find him not guilty.”  (Tr., p.33, Ls.1-3.)   
Finally, considering the instructions as a whole, the magistrate’s comments that the jury 
could use its common sense and was able to determine who to credit in a conflict could have no 
prejudicial effect.  These comments track part of the next jury instruction on evaluating evidence 
and testimony.  (See R., p.224 (Instruction No. 5).)  That instruction is based on I.C.J.I. 104 and 
is therefore presumptively correct.  McKay, 148 Idaho at 571 n.2, 225 P.3d at 704 n.2.  Even in 
isolation, the comments are to the same effect as the United States Supreme Court’s explanation 
of moral evidence and moral certainty, see Victor, 511 U.S. at 10-13, which is central to the 
question of reasonable doubt.  Bright has failed to show any error, much less fundamental error, 
in the magistrate judge’s comments while instructing the jury. 
Moreover, under the fundamental error standard, Bright cannot show that any error he 
claims is clear on the record, because the record presented on appeal lacks sufficient context to 
evaluate the magistrate’s comments.  Prefacing its comments, the magistrate clearly referenced 
something that happened the day before.  (See Tr., p.73, L.13 (“as I said yesterday”).)  The day 
before Bright’s misdemeanor trial, the magistrate held a trial in a separate case.  (Tr., p.26, Ls.4-
6.)  Some of the jurors in Bright’s case also served on the jury for that previous trial.  (See, e.g., 
Tr., p.30, Ls.2-4; p.34, Ls.11-13; p.40, Ls.10-12; p.42, Ls.7-8; p.43, Ls.3-5; p.71, Ls.9-11.)  But 
the record does not disclose what occurred at the previous day’s trial.  Because there is no 
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information in the record as to what occurred during that trial, other than that it was held, this 
Court is without sufficient information to evaluate the magistrate’s comments.  Had Bright raised 
an objection, the record may have been better developed.  As it stands, the magistrate’s comment 
is entirely without context—and it is apparent that there is context missing. 
Finally, Bright’s argument fails because he did not show that his failure to object was not 
a tactical decision.  Bright’s alleged error occurred at the very beginning of the trial, before any 
evidence had been presented to the jury—in fact, before opening statements.  Had Bright raised 
an objection, any error could have been remedied and would not have affected the rest of the 
trial.  Under Rule 30(b), as shown above, objections to the jury instructions must be raised before 
the jury retires to deliberate.  But Bright never raised to the magistrate court any objection to this 
alleged error in instructing the jury—not contemporaneously with the alleged error, nor at any 
time before the jury retired, nor even in his motion for a new trial.  (See Tr., generally; see also 
R., pp.249-53.)  Instead, Bright sat on his objection until after his conviction, only raising this 
issue for the first time to the district court on intermediate appeal.  (R., pp.322-25.)  One purpose 
of the fundamental error standard is to prevent litigants from “sandbagging the court, i.e., 
remaining silent about [their] objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not 
conclude in [their] favor.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976 (citation and internal 
quotation omitted).   
Because Bright failed to preserve through timely objection his argument that the district 
court erred in its instructions to the jury, he was required to show fundamental error to be entitled 
to review of this issue on appeal.  Bright did not attempt to show fundamental error on 
intermediate appeal to the district court.  (See R., pp.322-25, 365-66.)  Nor, as shown above, 
could Bright have shown fundamental error—first, because the instructions were not erroneous 
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and, second, because the error he alleged is not clear on the record.  The district court erred when 
it failed to apply the correct legal standard of fundamental error.  Under the correct legal 
standard, Bright’s claim of error fails.  The district court’s opinion on intermediate appeal should 
therefore be reversed and the judgment of the magistrate court affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s opinion on 
intermediate appeal and affirm Bright’s conviction and sentence. 
 




      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer____________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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